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THAT WE ARE UNDERLINGS: THE REAL 
PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINING POLITICAL 
SPENDING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Jedediah Purdy∗ 
We’re gathered at the intersection of professional reason and 
popular passion. The roughly two-thirds of Americans who have 
said they strongly oppose Citizens United 1 don’t have a theory of 
the First Amendment;2 they have a felt sense that the decision is 
an emblem of the political condition that unites Tea Partiers, 
Occupiers, and the Warren wing of the Democratic Party in 
shared disgust: the superior political influence and access of big 
business and great fortunes. This is the condition, or a subset of 
the condition, that Larry Lessig and Zephyr Teachout call 
corruption rightly understood: structural corruption that tethers 
the attention and loyalty of officials to the concerns of their 
financial patrons.3 
We’re being asked to apply our special tools and questions—
conceptual coherence, doctrinal workability, alertness to 
unintended consequences, and clashing values—to a problem that 
popular passion has put on the agenda: we are discussing how, and 
how far, this popular sentiment can take constitutional form. On 
these questions I have little to add to what others have said on this 
panel and throughout the day. I think there is room in a sensible 
constitutional scheme to limit money’s role in politics. I have no 
strong opinion about whether our doctrinal route should be an 
expanded conception of corruption, which starts from the 
 
 ∗  Robinson O. Everett Professor Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to 
my co-panelist Larry Tribe and to David Grewal, Larry Lessig, and Zephyr Teachout for 
helping me to understand my thinking on this topic. 
 1. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on 
Campaign Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html. 
 3. See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 276–90 (2014) (setting out 
an anti-corruption principle as the basis of campaign finance regulation); Lawrence Lessig, 
Out-Posting Post, in ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED 97–105 (2014) (setting out a 
version of the anti-corruption principle). 
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Supreme Court’s holding that preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption is the only government purpose that can 
justify restrictions on campaign spending;4 a revived idea of 
political equality, the notion that equal citizenship should put a 
limit on the disparity among different persons’ political efficacy; 
or the idea that electoral integrity, maintaining the link between 
public opinion and political outcomes, is a value internal to the 
First Amendment and can justify limits on campaign expenditure. 
To my mind, these are all paths to the same goal, which is 
loosening the grip that private wealth now has on every stage of 
the political process. 
I should stress, I am not sanguine about writing Congress a 
blank check to shape future elections, but I think the Buckley5 line 
of cases, as elaborated in Citizens United and McConnell,6 shows 
that if we apply the First Amendment’s intense skepticism toward 
regulation too readily to campaign spending and donations, we 
write a blank check to those who write the checks. For them, 
unlike elected officials, there is no accountability to the public. 
*** 
It is tempting, on the doctrinal level, to assert that First 
Amendment law has arrived at an antimony—that because the 
“money is not speech” slogan is superficial and unconvincing, and 
discrimination among speakers is severely disfavored, there just is 
no way to get hold of the problem of money in politics generally 
(nor in the subset of corporate political spending). I have 
advanced this argument myself in a popular essay, and I am afraid 
it is true that it tracks the drift of First Amendment law since 
Buckley v. Valeo.7 It is also true that it tracks the deep connection 
between wealth and the power to exercise a potentially boundless 
right like speech, the same connection that leads the radical-left 
stance on campaign spending to be “no socialism, no 
democracy!”—that is, as long as wealth is highly unequal, political 
influence will be as well.8 In these respects, it has the charisma of 
 
 4. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 313. 
 5. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 6. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 7. See Jedediah Purdy, Undo Citizens United? We’d Only Scratch the Surface, THE 
DAILY BEAST (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/12/ 
undo-citizens-united-we-d-only-scratch-the-surface.html; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) (establishing strong First Amendment protection for campaign expenditures). 
 8. See Nathan J. Robinson, Money Talks, JACOBIN (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www. 
jacobinmag.com/2015/01/capitalism-democracy-citizens-united/ (arguing that “capitalism 
will always undermine the promise of democratic equality”). 
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a double-headed realism: it is hard-nosed about what the law 
really is, on the one hand, and, on the other, about how the world 
really works. Between these two, it exercises a considerable 
attraction. 
But there is considerable space between these poles of 
pessimistic realism for the modest optimism of a meliorative 
liberalism. I am not convinced that there is anything in the logic 
of the social practices that the First Amendment regulates, or in 
the concept of speech, that requires the particular variety of 
monomaniacal rigor that Supreme Court majorities have been 
pursuing. 
It seems to me that several concepts could do the doctrinal 
work that is needed here. We need not worry too much about 
whether it is structural corruption, a robust conception of 
citizenship, or a division between the sphere of opinion formation 
and that of self-governance (or at least popular feedback, on the 
more restrictive intepretation). Any of these terms might serve 
well enough to stand for a congeries of rules permitting regulation 
of electoral spending. If the will is there to pursue the aim, the 
doctrinal way will follow. 
*** 
I’d like to step back from the technical questions to consider 
their connection to the broader political moment. The advocates 
for constitutional reform in this area have something in common 
with the activists who helped spur the arguments for the 
individual right to keep and bear arms, which the Supreme Court 
identified in 2008, or the Commerce Clause arguments against the 
Obamacare individual mandate that won five votes in 2012. Their 
energy has to do with the special symbolic status of the 
Constitution, the way that Americans identify with almost 
axiomatically, so that (A) if the Constitution says it, it must be 
right; and (B) if it’s right, the Constitution must say it. This politics 
works at the level of identity as well as interest and strategy: it 
speaks to the meaning people find in being Americans, and 
whether they feel the country has a place for them, and (closely 
related) whether they feel it is working or in crisis. 
What is different about this constitutional ferment is that, 
unlike fights about Obamacare, gun control, abortion, affirmative 
action, marriage equality, and religious expression, it does not 
simply rework the country’s partisan divides and identity politics 
into constitutional language. Activists are arguing for trans-
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partisan, trans-community, specifically civic constitutional value. 
Maybe more specifically, they are expressing their sense that 
Citizens United offends such a value. Because arguing about the 
Constitution is, in part, a way that we constitute ourselves as 
Americans, we should understand this ferment as an attempt to 
define, elevate, even create whatever constitutional commitment 
would be the opposite of Citizens United. 
I do not think it will do to say that money is property, not 
speech. Regulating spending is not like saying that you can’t put 
a sign on your car. Money is the universal means. You cannot 
deny people the use of the means to a right, then claim to take the 
right seriously. 
But speech is par excellence the civil right that you can 
exercise in proportion to your willingness to pay. Unlike rights of 
privacy, equal protection, or due process, it has no natural 
boundaries inhering in the person who exercises it. It just gets 
bigger and bigger until you stop spending. One might say that 
buying guns is analogous, but the second hundred million dollars 
that you spend on speech is simultaneously effective with, and 
probably as effective as, the first hundred million. Not true of your 
millionth gun. Spending on speech is more akin to exercising the 
right to raise your own militia. (Of course, at some point the next 
million dollars makes little difference in a saturated media 
market, or in relation to other constraints, such as limited voter 
enthusiasm. The point is that only the wealthy can contribute to 
such saturation; the declining marginal effectiveness of political 
spending is a problem of the very rich.) 
This wouldn’t so much matter if speech did not trench so 
closely on elections and political power. I don’t think anyone 
would doubt the constitutional right to spend your billions on 
Scientology pamphlets or radio stations broadcasting arguments 
against string theory. 
But the way that political spending gives some people—
natural and artificial—a very big speech right and leaves others 
very small trenches on a countervailing civic value. It is—and I am 
being deliberately vague here, because I think the intuition people 
have is vague and various—something about citizenship. 
Maybe it is the idea—rejected by the Supreme Court, but we 
are here to talk about overruling the Court—that, past a point, 
citizens must be the same size, that the one-person-one-vote 
principles expresses a commitment that touches on political 
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speech, and should tug the doctrine away from its libertarian 
acceptance that some people have big speech, some people small. 
Maybe it is the idea that citizenship is a quality of natural 
persons: that must be what we’re getting at when we say that 
artificial persons don’t have constitutional rights. Surely we don’t 
think the government could strip corporate assets without due 
process because they don’t belong to natural people. We mean 
they aren’t part of the political community. 
Maybe it is the idea—present in the language of corruption—
that, for voters and, especially, their representatives, there is a 
civic perspective that involves some idea of a common good, some 
effort to show equal concern and respect for every member of the 
community, and that excessive money in politics can (1) turn 
representatives’ attention and loyalty away from these general 
and inclusive perspectives to the narrower business of negotiating 
patronage; and (2) post-Citizens United, gives potentially great 
influence to entities whose legally ordained purpose is a narrow 
version of self-interest. 
Citizens United has become a symbolic stand-in for the 
general perception that politicians are unresponsive, that 
entrenched interests have too much power, that elections change 
nothing. As Debbie Hellman has shown with respect to the 
concept of corruption, once you try to turn these perceptions and 
feelings into an account of a constitutionally valid purpose, you 
need to articulate a positive idea of its opposite: an appropriately 
civic form of politics and government.9 That is hard to do 
conceptually, and probably politically as well: to begin with, Tea 
Party libertarians may like stripping corporate personhood of 
constitutional significance, but they are much less likely to go 
along with further-reaching restrictions on spending, because they 
tend to like wealthy individuals (just not collections of them under 
the corporate form) and because of the intensity of their mistrust 
of legislation. This is only the simplest example of the difficulty of 
forging this civic movement into even the beginning of a coherent 
view of how American democracy should look, as opposed to the 
present overlapping consensus that it looks like death warmed 
over. 
 
 9.  See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013) (so arguing). 
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*** 
One position that is tempting here is a radical one that simply 
insists that civic equality will be a chimera until economic equality 
approaches reality. This is the position that Walter Lippmann 
called the “socialist” stance already in his 1930 The Phantom 
Public, where he conceded that “[n]o serious student . . . would 
dispute that socialist premise which asserts that the weight of 
influence on society exercised by an individual is more nearly 
related to the character of his property than to his abstract legal 
citizenship.”10 As Lippmann acknowledged, this position has the 
appeal of grasping the nettle: the “socialist” point is made less 
frequently and less loudly, and by less respectable voices, than its 
empirical force would seem to require in a country that one 
influential quantitative study recently found highly unequal in the 
distribution of political influence.11 This fact, in turn, implies a 
harsh grim judgment on the boundaries of “respectable” speech 
about speech. One of the refreshing things about the expansion of 
political discourse in the last half-decade is that one can, again, 
hear Lippmann’s “socialist” point made in avowedly socialist and 
widely read, if not exactly respectable, publications.12 
What is less clear is whether the new new left of Brooklyn 
Marxists is any closer than Lippmann’s contemporaries were to 
resolving the problem that he set for them: to explain how 
subjecting more of the economy to ongoing political oversight 
could produce tolerable economic governance.13 More basically, 
he denied that there was reason to believe that democratic 
decisions would become informed and competent simply by virtue 
of removing unequal economic power from the equation. Such an 
idea, he insisted, must rest on “the mystical fallacy of democracy, 
that the people, all of them, are competent” if only their remit 
were greatly expanded.14 
The point here is that, for all the appeal that calling for real, 
i.e., material equality instead of the equal liberty of rich and poor 
alike to make million-dollar campaign donations, part of the 
reason the Supreme Court is not committed to deepening the 
 
 10. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 37 (1930). 
 11. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: 
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576–77 (concluding 
that “the majority does not rule) (emphasis original) and “America’s claims to being a 
democratic society are seriously threatened”). 
 12. See Robinson, supra note 8. 
 13. LIPPMANN, supra note 10 at 37–38. 
 14. Id. at 38. 
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democratization of American life is that a majority of the Justices, 
like Lippmann, seem to think that we have all the democracy we 
need. Moreover, they seem to agree with him that the democracy 
we have forms an articulate and devastating judgment on 
democracy as such. The democracy we have, that is, proves by its 
inadequacy that it is all the democracy we need. 
There is an old criticism of democracy, well expressed in 
James Madison’s Federalist No. 10, to the effect that majorities 
tend to be actuated by motives of greed (often enough for other 
people’s things) and fanaticism (often of the religious variety, but 
ideological too)—Madison might have considered an “improper 
or wicked project” such as “[a] rage for . . . an equal division of 
property” a blend of the two evils.15 It has often been combined 
with a view the conservative economist Joseph Schumpeter 
influentially expressed: that, while judgment tends to be 
eminently rational in economic matters that affect one’s self, 
political judgment is a domain of fantasy, projective speculation, 
and emotionally driven illogic. When Justices Kennedy and Scalia 
express their impatience with campaign-finance regulation and, 
by contrast, praise the importance of the economic interests 
represented by corporate donations, there is a subtext about 
whose voice matters: the industrious and rational (to borrow a 
phrase from John Locke), that is, the businessmen. The Justices 
are not alone in this attitude. 
*** 
The solution that Robert Post offers in his Tanner lectures 
(published as Citizens Divided) has its roots in a compromise 
position that Lippmann, Schumpeter, and others developed 
earlier, with various inflections. Post distinguishes between what 
we might call the discursive sphere of public-opinion formation, 
where strict scrutiny of speech and spending regulations is 
merited and no voice should ever be muted, and the decisive 
sphere of elections, where authoritative decisions must be taken 
through mediated majoritarianism. In the latter sphere, Post 
argues, we can understand the state as playing a special and 
appropriate administrative function to serve the [compelling] 
interest of electoral integrity. By “electoral integrity,” Post means 
nothing so robust as equal influence on decisions, but a rather un-
specific public confidence that political institutions and processes 
 
 15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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are responsive to public opinion. The basis for limiting spending 
within the domain of electoral decision is to head off public 
perceptions that governance has broken free of public 
accountability and now answers only to its financiers. 
This restricted specification of the democratic function goes 
back to Lippmann and Schumpeter, for whom the purpose of 
elections was to rotate elites through office, provide a brake 
between state power and the organs and individuals of the 
broader society, and resolve certain questions that arrived at 
loggerheads within the usual mechanisms of elite governance. The 
elevation of the discursive aspect of democracy, which is present 
in John Dewey, Jurgen Habermas, and Post’s own work on 
constitutional politics, represents a kind of compromise formation 
between idealism about the self-rule of equal citizens and 
cynicism about the competence of actually existing (or actually 
feasible) democracy.16 If the sovereign function of collective self-
rule must be restricted, at least the discursive activity of the polity 
can roam free. And in discourse, Post argues, there is no 
contradiction between equal citizenship and unequal economic 
capacity: if we are arguing about string theory, drug policy, or the 
advisability of humanitarian intervention, every checking account 
may do its best. There is no normative weight to the thought that 
each natural person should be equally able to influence the 
opinions of others. In a peculiar sense, it is precisely because 
public-opinion formation is assigned no governance tasks—that it 
has no responsibility, makes nothing happen, as W.H. Auden 
wrote of poetry (nothing directly traceable to it, anyway), that it 
is plausible to say that complete liberty and effective equality are 
mutually consistent in this sphere. 
But even this is not really satisfactory in the face of massive 
inequality and vast fortunes. Public opinion emerges, not from a 
mysterious (if not “mystical”) discursive soup, but rather from a 
definite discursive ecology, in which ideas have characteristic 
points of origin, channels of disseminations, ranks in status or 
other attractive or repellent characteristics, and so forth. 
Attitudes and assumptions, the obvious and the unthinkable, can 
get locked in, and they can get disrupted. The political economy 
of a polity is also an opinion economy, or ecology, favoring certain 
species of ideas (or certain classes of originators and 
disseminators of ideas). 
 
 16. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927); JURGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
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Inasmuch as the content of public opinion determines (and 
in some sense just is) the standard of legitimacy that elections 
enforce, the role of money in setting up think tanks, advocacy 
groups, media empires, and so forth, shapes the substance of 
public opinion in ways that precede money’s role in elections. If it 
is sensible for the public to doubt the “integrity” of elections in 
which money exercises too much influence (whatever exactly “too 
much” turns out to mean), it does not seem a confusion to be 
worried also about money’s influence on the formation of opinion 
in the broader institutional ecology. Indeed, while no one would 
call culture an “administrative” domain of the state, as Post 
proposes to do for elections, there is certainly a plausible case to 
be made for the importance of fostering diverse and, especially, 
heterodox voices within a country’s various battles of intellectual 
and cultural opinion. (No less a civil libertarian than John Stuart 
Mill insisted on the necessity of confrontation with unwelcome, 
marginal, and surprising ideas for the development of opinion, 
though he said little about the institutional setting in which this 
should take place.17) The means of pursuing this goal may include 
antitrust regulation in media, net neutrality rules, public media, 
subsidies in art and culture (whose relative independence from 
majoritarian pressures is obviously important if they are to foster 
counter-majoritarian opinion), tax policy that limits the power of 
great wealth to convert itself advantageously into advocacy non-
profits, and generous funding of independent public universities. 
Direct limits on spending in opinion formation would be clunky 
and smack of illiberalism, and the country is better off treating 
them as presumptively unconstitutional; but it is also possible to 
imagine various of the policies listed in the last sentence, at least 
in certain versions, coming under attack under the newly 
expansive anti-regulatory First Amendment.18 As structural 
contours channeling the flow of money in public-opinion 
formation, such regulation should be presumptively legitimate, 
even though they do not address the special domain of elections 
but rather the “upstream” activity of opinion formation. 
*** 
To my mind, the harder question is whether the diffuse sense 
that Citizens United stands for an anti-democratic, anti-civic 
 
 17. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
 18. See Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New 
Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2014) (so arguing). 
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tendency in American law and life can produce the kind of 
popular-constitutional energy that could power whatever 
doctrinal formula might come to name the power to regulate 
electoral spending. Whether we imagine that politics as a focusing 
and decisive constitutional moment of the kind Bruce Ackerman 
has theorized or as the more diffuse and contingent work of 
movements and rhetoricians that Robert Post and Reva Siegel 
have explored, it is noteworthy that some of the most capable and 
ambitious scholars to engage the problem of money in politics 
have moved to put at least one foot in movement-building.19 I 
think of Larry Lessig, who at the time that I revised this Essay had 
recently led a band of anti-Citizens United marchers on a chilly 
pilgrimage through New Hampshire, and of Zephyr Teachout, 
who (with her running mate Professor Tim Wu) in 2014 made an 
astonishingly effective primary challenge to New York’s sitting 
governor in the Democratic primary. This is unusual, to say the 
least: scholars may align themselves with movements—many in 
human rights and environmental law do so quite organically; but 
to put one’s shoulder to the wheel of creation is another thing. 
Does it say anything about the politics we are waiting for that we 
are either waiting or, among the bold, going out to try to make it? 
Why, in other words, has it not arisen spontaneously in a more 
definite and effective form? 
I can’t even speculate on this question with any institutional 
or historical refinement, but I can offer a few stray thoughts about 
the inhibitions such a politics faces in this cultural moment. For 
one, this is a time of political mistrust and disgust: toward all three 
branches of government and toward partisans on the other side of 
the aisle.20 It is a heyday for mobilizing sentiment against some 
source of grievance: Obamacare, the Iraq war, Citizens United. It 
is a harder time for generating enough agenda overlap, confidence 
in institutions, and capacity for compromise to agree on new 
ground rules for something as basic to democracy as campaign 
finance. Every issue that becomes politically salient tends to 
become partisan, often in ways that have more to do with imputed 
 
 19. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE (setting out theory of constitutional 
moments); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE 
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25–34 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
 20. See Public Trust in Government: 1958–2014, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 13, 
2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/ (finding that 
“trust in the government remains near historic lows”); Political Polarization in the 
American Public: Growing Partisan Antipathy, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-2-growing-partisan-antipathy/ (reporting 
“a rising tide of mutual antipathy” between members of the major parties). 
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cultural meaning than with any more concrete merits: consider 
climate change, on its face a scientific and technical problem of 
overarching public concern, in practice a partisan lightning-rod 
and point of catechisms, left and right.21 This could only go double 
for a measure that laid the ground rules for pursuit of political 
power, as campaign finance law does. The shoals of suspicion and 
dissension should be expected to claim many worthy vessels here. 
That first concern has to do with partisanship—which is a 
perfectly legitimate, even important attitude, but which has a 
particular unconstructive cast just now, tending to distort the 
merits of even the most concrete questions and erode confidence 
in institutions that simply must be able to take authoritative 
decisions if issues such as campaign finance regulation are to be 
resolved. The current partisanship, then, basically impedes the 
capacity for governance, and that is what makes it a threat to any 
prospect of progress on the challenges we are discussing here. 
The second concern I want to raise is even more diffuse, but 
I think that it names a real thing nonetheless. It is the cultural 
cachet, even hegemony, of a certain kind of economistic thinking, 
which identifies economic rationality with rationality as such. 
Americans live in an economic order that tells us, in a hundred 
daily ways, that that all choice is consumer choice, all efforts and 
relationships are investment, and that democracy is just a subset 
of the market. We see one symptom of this in the Citizens United 
opinion, where Justice Kennedy treats voting as a rational 
consumer choice (as it would be modeled by the most unworldly 
of pre-behavioralist economists), which supports his astonishing 
conclusion that more campaign spending just provides more 
information to voters, and is in fact a tribute to voters’ power and 
reason. But it is a more broadly shared attitude, and its effect is to 
erode any distinction between the specifically civic, would-be 
egalitarian domain of electoral decision and the pursuit of self-
interest (material and ideological) in the free-for-all marketplace 
of ideas, where money and manipulation are the instruments of 
persuasion. This economistic attitude fosters the suspicion that 
civic language is just a sententious name for one’s own interests 
and the views one happens to hold. This suspicion must be partly 
true even under the best of circumstances, which is precisely why 
 
 21. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, What You “Believe” Bbout Climate Change Doesn’t Reflect 
What You Know; It Expresses *Who You Are*, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (Apr. 
23, 2014), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/4/23/what-you-believe-about-clim
ate-change-doesnt-reflect-what-yo.html. 
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the temptation to adopt it without reservation is acute and 
hazardous. 
*** 
I end with something Larry Tribe wrote the year I was born, 
about environmental law: on the deepest issues, consistency can 
be dangerous. The space in which people can be active and 
creative is often in the tension between irreconcilable principles.22 
It is hard to make the case for citizenship and the public 
interest, easier to make the case against it. But it only gets harder 
if we don’t try; and, we might find, these are ideas we can’t do 
without, even if we still need to build the institutions in which they 
will make more sense. It’s an irony of politics guided by a reflexive 
contempt of government that it tends to starve, constrain, and 
distort governance until it has produced contemptible institutions. 
If people do not believe that citizenship is distinct from being 
a worker, consumer, or boss; if they do not believe it is possible to 
think and argue in good faith about something called the public 
interest; if they do not believe democracy really is more than an 
awkward attendant to twenty-first century capitalism; then they 
will have lost a measure of their power to make their own history. 
 
 22. Laurence Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 
(1974). 
